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4ABSTRACT
 The privileging of internal resources over external finance is not
only the most democratic but also the most politically desirable option.
The implications of the ADB loan for Kerala is situated against this
premise by employing an empirical political economy method. The paper
is divided into five  sections. In section 1, along with the structure of the
loan, the current status of state finance is briefly outlined. Section 11
explores two hypotheses: the Resource Mobilisation Crisis Hypothesis
and the Debt Overhang Hypothesis. In section 111, the socio-political
implications of the ADB loan are discussed in the context of the
conditionalities imposed.  In section IV, viable alternatives are analysed
with special emphasis on internal resource mobilisation and section V
summarises observations. It is pointed out that the debt sustainability in
Kerala was foreclosed by the late 90s with the state is in debt overhang.
The ADB loan would only be an attack on the fiscal health of the state.
Moreover, the class bias of the state blinds it to encrypted sources of funds
which in Kerala help foster social structures of accumulation, leading to
what could be called a state-‘augmented/patronised’ fiscal crisis. If the
Kerala government were to adhere to ADB-driven governance, it would
culminate in social de-investment, “commodification” of critical sectors
such as education and health and thereby a reversion of whatever remains
of the Kerala model of social development; vulnerable social sections
being the hardest hit.  Although the state has accepted the first tranche, it
could just as well withdraw totally from the ADB package. What is required
is a concerted effort towards an internal resource mobilisation which would
liberate the state from its commitment to the high-conditionality ADB
loan. A mere 20 per cent or less of the locked up funds/arrears would save
the state from seeking the second tranche. The state would be well advised
to first stop further borrowing from the ADB and to dispense  with the
ADB policy package, and, second, to renounce the path of externally-
driven neo-liberal reforms.
Key words: Asian Development Bank, Fiscal Deficit, Debt Overhang,
Resource Mobilisation, Social Structures of Accumulation,
Kerala, India
JEL Classification: G2, G38, H1, H2
5Introduction
Despite the dismal record of the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
in the Asia Pacific region,1  the Government of India as part of its second
generation reforms drives the various Indian states to commit themselves
to an involvement with this Manila-based multilateral institution. It is
difficult to comprehend to why the Government of Kerala feels compelled
to opt for a high-conditionality loan from the ADB? To some, the
economic argument is the paucity of internal resources, which leaves no
option but to take recourse to external finance. It is also argued that the
privileging of internal resources over external finance is not only the
most democratic but also the politically correct option. But, Kerala,
which has shown a consistently high level of social development through
“public action” and democratisation of civil society (Dreze & Sen, 1995;
Ramachandran 1997; Kannan 1995, Tornquist 2002; also see George
1993) is now being coerced into complying with the neo-liberal agenda
of the ADB. And while the Left Democratic Front and the ruling United
Democratic Front point accusing fingers at each other, two things have
become clear: it was at the prompting of the present opposition that the
ADB first set foot in Kerala; 2  and neither the LDF nor the UDF has had
the clarity of vision to seek a peoples’ mandate before opting for such a
huge loan.
6This paper is an attempt at an empirical political economy analysis
on the (likely) implications of the ADB loan for Kerala and explores the
possible alternatives to external finance. The paper is divided into five
sections. In section 1, along with the structure of the loan, the current
status of state finance is briefly outlined. Section 11 explores two
hypotheses: the Resource Mobilisation Crisis Hypothesis and the Debt
Overhang Hypothesis. In section 111, the socio-political implications
of the ADB loan are discussed in the context of the conditionalities
imposed.  In section IV, other viable alternatives to the ADB loan are
analysed and section V summarises the concluding observations.
Section I
Structure and Composition of the Loan
ADB’s US$775 million loan - more than 3700 crores of rupees - as
is envisaged now is meant to launch three sets of reforms: (i) the
Modernising Government Programme and Fiscal Reforms (MGP) with a
quota of US$ 375 million including the co-finance by the Netherlands
with US$75 million (ii) the Power Sector Reforms, and (iii) the Urban
Development, Environmental Improvement and Poverty Reduction
Programme, each being apportioned US$200 million respectively
(Table 1). The loan for Fiscal Reforms, the agreement on which has been
finalised, is a cluster loan comprising two sub-programmes: the first
would receive the allotted US$200 million in two equal tranches and
the remaining US$100 would again be disbursed in sequence, every
fresh disbursal hinging on the state’s adherence to the prescribed reform
programme. The first tranche of  US$125 has already been accepted by
the state; the requisite policy changes and alterations in governance are
being implemented towards the second tranche which is expected in
early 2004.
7Table 1:  Details of the Loan envisaged
Sl No Name of the Programme Amount of Year of
 Loan US$ beginning
 million
1 Modernising Government
Programme and Fiscal Reform December
(MGP) 375+  2002
Sub Programme 1: Tranches 125*
125*   Early  2004
Sub Programme 2: Tranche 125*
2 The Power Sector Reforms 200 2003-4
3 Urban Development, the
Environmental Improvement and
 Poverty Reduction Programme 200 2003-4
Total 775
+ US$300 ADB loan + US $75 GoN
* includes US$25 million worth  co-financing by GoN in three
equal tranches (total US $75)
Source:  ADB Documents, MGP office, GoK, Thiruvananthapuram
The loan would be received by the Government of India (GoI),
which would then direct it to Kerala in a 70:30 loan-grant ratio as
Additional Central Assistance. The repayment would be over a twenty-
year period with a grace period of five years. The GoI would receive the
finance from the ADB’s London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)-based
policy lending facility at an interest rate of less than 3 per cent, a
8commitment charge of 0.75 per cent per annum and a front-end-fee of
1.0 per cent. The interest rate that the state is expected to pay to the
Centre for the loan portion is as high as 10.5 per cent in rupee terms;
considering the grant component, the effective incidence would be only
8.05 per cent or less, the state government asserts. As of now, it is the GoI
that would bear the foreign exchange risk on the loan which would have
to be paid back in dollars but the possibility of at least a partial transfer
of risk to the state government cannot be ruled out.
Two sets of problems that the Government of Kerala faces, as
identified by the ADB on the breakdown of the finances of the state
relates to the low economic growth and the poor performance of public
service systems which, the ADB asserts, mutually reinforce one another.
It would seem that the ADB’s reading of the state’s fiscal position is first
of all partial, and secondly, that its obvious agenda is the
institutionalisation of neo-liberal reforms serving the interests of market
capitalism. In support of the above inference, we consider two hypotheses
which are developed in such a way that they would not only unravel the
position of the State with respect to the ADB loan but would also help us
understand the implications of the same and to seek viable alternatives,
particularly, alternative sources of funds within the state.
State Finances:
Over the years, there has surely been a significant deterioration in
the finances of the various states in India, particularly since the mid
1980s. There have also been wide variations in the fiscal health status
across the states (Appendix 1).  Though they  themselves have contributed
to this, had it not been for the drastic dip in Central transfers (Rao, 2002:
3261-71; Rao & Nath, 2000:2806-9; George, 2002; Pinaki 1995)
coupled with the adverse effects of globalisation, many of the states
would have escaped the massive fiscal imbalances that are now manifest.
9The situation in Kerala is much worse than that in the other states, with
the history of its fiscal deficit going back much longer than the others
(George, 1999; 1998:35-40).
 All the fiscal indicators with respect to Kerala – the fiscal deficit,
revenue deficit and primary deficit – have shown an increasing trend as
a percentage of the State Domestic Product from the mid-nineties
(Table 2). The share of revenue deficit in the total fiscal deficit was as
high as 80% in the late nineties, one of the highest in India. The responses
of various states in India to their respective fiscal imbalances have been
Table 2:    Deficit indicators as a percentage of NSDP in Kerala, 1990-
1 to 2000-01
Year RD/NSDP FD/NSDP PD/NSDP RD/FD PD/FD
1990-91 3.47 6.56 3.37 52.85 51.39
1991-92 2.41 5.32 2.12 45.35 39.83
1992-93 1.96 4.26 1.10 46.09 25.89
1993-94 1.59 4.00 1.06 39.71 26.52
1994-95 1.39 3.86 1.01 36.07 26.07
1995-96 1.15 3.71 1.08 30.92 29.06
1996-97 1.58 3.78 1.08 41.69 28.46
1997-98 2.34 5.04 2.31 46.52 45.95
1998-99 3.59 5.33 2.65 67.39 49.77
1999-00 6.17 7.27 3.94 79.89 54.25
2000-01 4.99 6.15 2.57 81.16 41.78
Note:   RD = Revenue Deficit, PD = Primary Deficit, FD = Fiscal Deficit
2001-02 - Revised estimates
Source: various issues of RBI bulletins
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varied, ranging from public expenditure cuts and treasury restrictions to
borrowing from various sources including multilateral financial
institutions. While Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh have
opted for World Bank loans, others like Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and
Kerala have resorted to high-conditionality loans from the ADB.
It is the mismatch between revenue expenditure and revenue
receipts with  the former increasing faster than their revenue that concerns
us most. While the ratio of aggregate revenue to NSDP declined from 19
per cent to 13 per cent and the state’s own revenue declined from 11 per
cent to 9 per cent during the 1990s, the decline in revenue expenditure
to NSDP is only marginal, say from 23 per cent to 20 per cent (Appendix
2). In terms of growth, the revenue expenditure grew by 17 per cent as
against 14 per cent of revenue itself during the 1990s. In other words,
the state has been meeting the revenue expenditure through an ever
increasing volume of borrowings in which the share of low-cost loans
from the Centre keeps declining making the State ever more dependant
on high cost loans (Table 3). The state with its medium term fiscal
reforms had aimed at wiping out of the revenue deficit by 2004-05.
However, though the ratio of revenue deficit to revenue receipt came
down to 28.77 per cent in 2001-02, it increased to 38.76 per cent
by 2002-03. The ceiling for fiscal deficit at 2 per of the GDP  as stipulated
by the Fiscal Responsibility Act would remain an unattainable
goal.
   It seems pertinent here to pose a crucial question: what exactly
has been the cause of such a ‘fiscal crisis’ in Kerala? Is it the negative/
slow growth of its economy as conventionally argued, or is it just a lack
of mobilisation of resources/revenues leading to a liquidity squeeze?
We attempt to answer these questions with the help of two hypotheses as
mentioned earlier in Section 11.
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Table 3:  Financing/composition of fiscal deficit
Year RD FD RD as Internal  Loans & adv. PF etc. as
% FD  as % total From centre % total
debt  as % total debt
 debt
1991-92 364 803 45.3 21.72 54.11 24.17
1992-93 337 732 46.1 28.51 50.94 20.55
1993-94 371 935 39.7 20.31 44.64 35.05
1994-95 400 1109 36.1 21.03 41.82 37.15
1995-96 403 1303 30.9 29.36 45.00 25.64
1996-97 643 1542 41.7 34.03 36.04 29.94
1997-98 1123 2414 46.3 39.75 33.43 26.82
1998-99 2030 3112 67.4 27.52 28.59 43.90
1999-00 3624 4536.6 79.89 19.09 21.80 59.11
2000-01 3147 3877 81.2 41.12 13.32 45.56
2001-02 1886 2812 67.0 58.44 20.47 21.10
2002-03 2200 2952 74.5 56.17 26.01 17.82
Note: 2001-02 – revised estimates, 2002-03 – budget estimates.
Source: CMIE, Public Finance, February 1999 & March 2002.
Section II
Hypothesis  1 -  Resource Mobilisation Crisis Hypothesis:
We distinguish between the possible sources of fiscal crisis: the
economy-augmented fiscal crisis(EaFC); Centrally-induced Fiscal Crisis
(CaFC) and the state-augmented/patronised Fiscal crisis(Sa/pFC). It
implies that the crisis is not necessarily uni-factorial in its genesis and
sustenance. It could be multi-factorial in origin.
Economy-Augmented Fiscal Crisis?
 Contrary to the trend in the early 1980s,  the Kerala economy
registered a revival from the early 90s, and stayed above the all-India
12
Table 4: Growth rates in NDP by Economic Activity, Kerala and All India
Period All India Kerala
Agri Percapita     Agri Industry Service NSDP Percapita
& Allied   Industry    Service NSDP NSDP    & Allied NSDP
(Old series, 1981-2=100)-Exponential
1981-2 - to 1990-1 3.20 6.70 6.40 5.36 3.23 3.70 4.50 4.40 4.83 3.39
1991-2 to 1996-7 3.20 6.80 6.50 5.64* 3.80 5.90 5.00 7.90 6.05* 5.10
(New Series, 1993-4 = 100)-Exponential
1993-4 to 2000-1 2.60 5.50 8.17 6.05 4.12 1.21 4.88 6.86 4.93 3.82
(New Series, 1993-4 = 100)-Simple Averages
1993-4 to 2000-1 2.62 6.35 8.14 6.12 4.11 2.24 6.40 7.06 5.53 4.39
1997-8 to 2000-1 1.10 3.14 8.33 5.22 3.20 1.05 4.83 7.89 5.52 4.51
Note:    Figures for the old series are adopted from Subrahmanian and Azeez 2000, Table 3, and for the new series, we have
calculated both the exponential growth rates as well as simple average growth rates. However, as the number of
observations is few, the exponential growth rates are calculated only for the whole period. Figures with * marks are
for 1991-2 to 1997-8.
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average until the mid-nineties (Table 4). Though it could not maintain
this tempo, the economy has still been performing well (Subrahmanian
& Azeez, 2000). This was despite the aberrations created in the cash
crop sectors owing to trade agreements such as the WTO and the  India-
Sri Lanka free trade pact3 , the declining trend in the devolution of
revenues to the state, and the successful implementation of the statutes
of the revised pay commission. It may be seen from the table 4 that the
growth performance of Kerala has improved significantly in the nineties,
though it later showed a marginal drop in growth rates; however, it is
still comparable with that of all India averages. Available evidence
suggests that the Kerala economy as such is not in crisis; rather, its
performance relative to certain other states is quite commendable. The
origins of the liquidity crisis in the state thus lie outside the performance
of the productive sectors of the economy.
Centrally-augmented FC?
 Both the Central and the State governments seem to think that
the states’ revenue deficit is entirely of the latter’s own making. A counter-
factual question would be in order: what would have happened to the
state’s revenue deficit had the state continued to get the same level of
transfers from the Centre as it had  received prior to the 90s? The increase
in the revenue deficit of around 3  percentage point has been more than
matched by the sharp reduction in Central assistance to the state, by
around 5 per cent point. More specifically, the Central assistance and
current transfers to Kerala as a proportion of NSDP declined from 10.43
and 6.62  in 1991-92 to 5.91 and 4.09 respectively in 1999-2000, similar
to most other states in India (Rao 2002). Within the current transfers
both the tax devolution and the total grants have shown declining trends
(Table 5).  Further, Kerala remains far behind the rest of the States in
terms of the average growth rate in total central transfers with 8.3%
compared to 12.5% ; with regard to per capital central transfers, too,
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Kerala has received lesser allocations than the other states from the
sixth plan onwards. (George and Krishnakumar 2003: 5)  Had the state
been able to bargain with the Centre to get the same level of transfers, its
deficit position would not have deteriorated. More than  such
unfavourable federal relations, to which we return later, it is the state
augmented/patronised liquidity crisis that appears to have wrought
greater damage to the economy and society to which we now turn.
State-augmented/patronised Fiscal Crisis?
  It is our contention  that the origins of the liquidity crisis in the
state could be traced to the weak/biased resource mobilisation therein.
The powerful social structures in the state have remained more or less
non-contributory to the state exchecquer. More importantly, there has
Table 5:  Central Assistance to Kerala (%)
Year CA to TD to CT to TG to RD/ FD/ Trans-
 NSDP  NSDP NSDP NSDP NSDP NSDP   fers as %
TRR
1991-92 10.43 3.82 3.81 2.81 2.41 5.32 33.08
1992-93 10.1 4.00 3.08 3.01 1.96 4.26 34.72
1993-94 8.08 3.21 2.55 2.33 1.59 4 31.97
1994-95 7.88 2.92 2.61 2.34 1.39 3.86 31.52
1995-96 6.38 2.96 1.87 1.56 1.15 3.71 27.76
1996-97 5.67 3.04 1.32 1.3 1.58 3.78 28.2
1997-98 6.55 2.65 1.45 2.44 2.34 5.04 29.01
1998-99 5.22 2.44 1.54 1.24 3.59 5.33 27.66
1999-00 5.91 2.62 1.83 1.47 6.17 7.27 27.91
2000-01 5.91 2.62           2.32 0.90 4.61 5.68         25.22
Source:   CMIE, Public Finance, February 1999 & March 2002.
NSG=  non-statutory grants, SG= statutory grants, Oth= others,
CT= current transfers, CT= capital transfers, TG= total grants.
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been a persistent derailment of resource mobilisation in the state, which
is largely state-augmented/patronised and reflective of its class bias. In
spite of an operation of a vibrant consumer market, the sales tax potential
is not adequately tapped. Tax arrears continue to build up; there is also
an ever increasing revenue loss owing to under-assessment of tax,
incorrect computation and under valuation of items. The locked up
funds in the state come up to more than Rs3000 crores of rupees, an
amount almost equivalent to the ADB loan. The composition of the
state is of a nature that blinds it to such potential sources of funds. Large
business traders, business groups and private capital form multiple nodes
in the power-chain that binds the state into inaction;the same is dealt
with in detail when we examine the alternatives to the ADB loan
(section IV).
Hypothesis 2: Debt Overhang Hypothesis
 The probability of debt sustainability in Kerala was already
foreclosed by the mid 90s and the state has already fallen into the phase
of what is called debt overhang; the internal debt trap is too close for
one’s comfort.
The debt cycle, as conceived in this paper,  passes through three
phases: in the first,  debt comes as a relief in the face of  resource-
deficiency and it remains desirable as long as it is sustainable; in the
second phase, it becomes unsustainable when the debt servicing costs
surpass revenue receipts leading to what is called debt overhang; the
last phase ushers  the state into a debt trap wherein it would not be
capable of generating enough surplus even for debt servicing. The state
of Kerala appears to have entered into the second phase of debt overhang.
 As a concept, debt overhang has alternative formulations, and as
a mechanism, it operates through several channels.4 The essence of debt
overhang is that it constraints investment in productive and social
16
sectors.  First, it leads to an increased tendency on the part of the state to
make further cuts in social expenditure. Second, in this phase, the debt
servicing cost overtakes the growth in NSDP, development expenditure
and the state’s own revenue. Third, the acceptance of  a new loan would
do nothing to alleviate debt overhang, rather it would only accentuate
the process of resource transfers.
If we are to grasp the true consequences of the ADB loan in Kerala,
we would have to first  examine the existing public debt situation of the
state. Like many other states in India, the outstanding debt of Kerala too
has been rising during the 1990s. In absolute terms, the total debt of the
state increased from 4716 crores in 1990-1 to 23920 in 2001-02 and to
31060 in 2002-35  and further estimated at around Rs 36000 by the end
of the current financial year of 2003-04  - with the per capita debt of
more than Rs 11000. The debt indicators such as the debt-state domestic
product ratio and the debt-servicing ratio show the vulnerability of  the
state to the extreme. The debt servicing cost went up from 483.42 crores
in 1990-91 to around 3000 crores in 2002-03. The major part of the
state’s debt is to the Centre, though its share keeps on declining. The
ratio of outstanding state debt to the NSDP is more than 34 per cent, one
among the highest in India; debt servicing accounts more than one-
fourth of the total revenue receipts. The proportion of debt servicing to
total revenue expenditure and NSDP in Kerala is higher than the middle
incomes states in India (Appendix 3). Even if there is a decline in the
market interest rates for loans, the debt servicing as a percentage of
revenue expenditure is expected to increase as the volume of loans/
borrowal increases sharply: within the last one year alone, the present
government has increased its debt by more than 50 per cent.
The repayment capacity has not been catching up with the growth
of the cost of debt servicing. The state has to take the service obligations
of the debt it has to the Centre as well as those raised through other
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sources such as ‘Internal Debt’ and Provident Funds’. It is precisely this
sort of a problem that leads one to raise the question of sustainability of
public debt. Debt becomes unsustainable at two levels: (I) Once the
accumulated debt servicing - interest payments plus amortization - grows
beyond the threshold level of around 15 per cent of the total revenue
receipts/domestic budgetary revenues6  of states including devolution
and grants, debt could be considered as  unsustainable and (2) Yet another
indicator could be the relative growth rates in NSDP and Debt Servicing
and if the latter grows at a higher rate than the former, debt could be
deemed unsustainable. If we take the first norm, the possibility of debt
sustainability in Kerala was foreclosed by the early 90s; by the second
norm the state’s debt became unsustainable by the mid 90s; in both the
cases, the state had passed the level of debt sustainability by the second
half of the 90s pulling the state into what is called debt overhang,
particularly the high-cost debt overhang; the internal debt trap is too
close for one’s comfort (Table 6).
The important inferences one could draw with respect to the years
since 1996-97 include (Table 7):
1. Gr of DSC > NSDP
2. Gr of DSC > DE, save 1997-98
3. Gr of DSC > OR
4. Gr of DSC > SS
So what has the ADB loan to do with the debt overhang?
Firstly, the  ADB loan is no cure for the debt overhang of the state.
Secondly, it would only accentuate the problem of debt overhang
leading the economy into an internal debt trap. We would argue that a
persistence with current fiscal policy would lead to  debt unsustainability.
With the acceptance of the entire loan amount of Rs 3700 crores by
18Table 6:   Debt Servicing Cost (DSC) as a percentage of TRE, TRR and NSDP in Kerala
       (Rs crores), 1990-1 to 1999-00
Year Total Debt TD/SDP DSC DSC/TRE DSC/TRR DSC/ OR DSC/NSDP
(TD)
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
1990-91 4716.79 38.75 388.21 13.74 16.16 25.41 3.19
1991-92 5466.56 36.20 483.42 15.03 16.95 25.33 3.20
1992-93 6297.13 36.66 542.51 14.84 16.35 25.04 3.16
1993-94 7198.67 30.76 687.16 16.01 17.52 25.75 2.94
1994-95 8820.87 30.74 819.67 16.18 17.57 25.65 2.86
1995-96 10113.54 28.82 924.16 15.86 17.04 23.59 2.63
1996-97 11420.91 27.98 1103.41 16.26 17.96 25.01 2.70
1997-98 12868.14 26.85 1304.78 15.83 18.33 25.82 2.72
1998-99 15700.28 27.76 1512.96 16.40 21.02 29.05 2.67
1999-00 20176.00 34.37 1952.27 16.88 24.58 34.11 3.33
2000-01 23919.00 34.29 2257.60 18.00 25.85 34.57 3.12
2001-02 26951.00 34.00 2489.00 20.36 27.48 38.50 3.13
2002-03 31060.00 34.15 2947.00 19.07 27.71 37.00 3.24
Note:  2001-02 – revised estimates. TRE= total revenue expenditure, TRR= total revenue receipts, DSC= interest pay-
ments & servicing of debt, NSDP= net state domestic product, OR= state’s own revenue. Source: computed from
RBI bulletins; Budget In Brief, GoK, 2004-05.
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Table 7: Annual Growth rates of major expenditure indicators
Year NSDP GR DSC GR Devt. GR OR GR Edu- GR Medical GR SS Exp GR
Exp cation
1990-91 5262 168 779 670 335 92 552
1991-92 5365 2 172 2 699 -10 678 1 297 -11 79 -14 480 -13
1992-93 5752 7 182 6 764 9 725 7 305 3 77 -3 483 1
1993-94 7723 34 222 22 837 10 864 19 371 22 92 19 575 19
1994-95 8389 9 237 7 872 4 924 7 391 5 99 8 602 5
1995-96 8726 4 228 -4 843 -3 968 5 354 -9 83 -16 571 -5
1996-97 9075 4 246 8 903 7 984 2 360 2 82 -2 600 5
1997-98 9272 2 270 10 1039 15 1044 6 364 1 87 6 637 6
1998-99 9843 6 292 8 1088 5 1004 -4 378 4 90 4 646 1
1999-00 10521 7 350 20 1167 7 1026 2 468 24 105 16 754 17
2000-01 11245 7 372 6 1049 -10 1076 5 432 -8 96 -8 690 -8
Source: CMIE, Public Finance, February 1999 & March 2002.
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2003-04, contractual debt servicing obligations would soar to not less
than  Rs 3300-3400 crores inclusive of pre-existing debts. Any fresh
borrowing therefore would only further compromise the financial well
being of the state - the annual debt servicing for the ADB loan alone
would be within the range of Rs3000-3700 million for about a decade
(appendix 4 and 5). This would reduce the availability of resources for
capital formation and domestic investment. Considering the fact that
almost the entire plan expenditure of the state has been financed through
borrowings from 1997-98 onwards, the increased debt servicing on
account of the ADB loan and other forms of borrowing would further
compromise the state’s fiscal health and as well as its future prospects.
Further, the state has already been forced into unconstitutional practices
of financial management such as ‘memo clearance’ for the day to day
functioning of various departments; such practices are largely lie outside
the ambit of the legislative proceedings. For the years 2003-04 and
2004-05, the ADB loan and the other Externally Aided Project has
brought in a foreign fund component of around 25 per cent to the plan
outlay; it was 9 per cent in the previous year and a mere 2 per cent still
earlier.  This would obviously work against the state interests making it
ever more dependent on external finance.  As the borrowed funds are not
basically intended to reach the directly productive sectors, the problem
is likely to be aggravated.  With the state being expected to generate
counterpart funds for the new governance programme, there would be a
further diversion of funds away from the productive sectors. More over,
the ADB touch will be only too evident in the forthcoming five-year
plans and the annual budgets just as it has been with respect to the
present one. Wrong prioritisation - agriculture and traditional industries
on the one hand and the social sector on the other would get a low and
diminishing allocation as against a substantial share for programmes
like modernising governance - would characterise the subsequent
21
planning process.  As the state has to set aside much more than one third
of its own revenue for debt servicing and about one fourth of the Total
Revenue Receipts and about 20 per cent of the Total Revenue
Expenditure, the already shrinking social sector expenditure (Table 8)
would become the first major casualty.
 It must be pointed out here that the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP 1991: 44; also see Dev & Mooij 2002) considers it
desirable for a country to have a social allocation ratio - the percentage
of public expenditure earmarked for social services - of more than 40 per
Table 8: Social sector expenditure ratios: Kerala
Year  SE/AE AE/NSDP SE plus EDU/ HEALTH/
RD/AE AE AE
1990-91 39.69 26.44 42.61 24.09 6.61
1991-92 36.73 24.35 40.18 22.73 6.05
1992-93 35.41 23.70 38.62 22.39 5.65
1993-94 36.33 20.90 39.59 23.42 5.81
1994-95 35.90 20.21 38.83 23.29 5.92
1995-96 34.19 19.26 37.08 21.24 5.00
1996-97 34.72 18.99 38.28 20.85 4.75
1997-98 32.23 19.97 40.61 18.41 4.39
1998-99 32.59 18.17 42.10 19.05 4.53
1999-00 33.57 20.03 40.49 20.82 4.66
2000-01 32.91 18.65 39.23 20.59 4.57
Note:  SE= social expenditure, AE= aggregate expenditure, NSDP= net state
domestic product, RD= rural development, EDU= education.
Source:  CMIE, Public finance, Various issues.
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cent.  Even as India sported a ratio of 34 per cent throughout the
liberalisation decade of the 1990s. Kerala, however, had a commendable
social allocation ratio of 41 per cent in 1990-91. But as neo-liberal
reforms took root in Kerala, share of expenditure on health and education
kept declining, and the social allocation ratio dwindled to 35 per cent
in the mid 90’s and further down to 33 per cent in 2000-01, far below the
UNDP standard. If the Kerala government were to adhere ADB-led
governance and prescriptions, it would ultimately lead to social de-
investment, the consequences of which would tell particularly upon the
vulnerable sections of the society: the ADB loan is quite obviously not
the right “fiscal medicine” for the state.
Section III
The (In) human Face: Socio-Political Implications of the ADB Loan
Almost as a perfect foil to its commercial loan, the ADB has put
forth specific policy conditionalities as part of its shift from “project
lending” to “programme lending” which would also co-ordinate well
with the Structural Adjustment Programme of the World Bank. The
Government of Kerala has acquiesced in this respect too. A few of the
stipulations are worth the mention. In future, all contracts or agreements
or even negotiations with other financial agencies/donors would have
to be discussed with the ADB, which reserves the right to insist on a
cross-conditionality with respect to other foreign contracts. 7  In clearer
terms, the Government loses its right to freedom of decision making in
matters of finance; the state even forfeits its freedom to enter into bilateral
negotiations with other financial agencies/countries. The other
specifications are equally repressive: as part of restructuring of State
Level Public Enterprises (SLPEs), the state would have to assure a
minimum annual “net attrition rate of one per cent”, approval and
extension of Voluntary Retirement Scheme and Employee Separation
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Scheme to all categories of workers, and successful implementation of
the recommendations of the Enterprise Reforms Committee (ERC) to
the effect of accepting “alternative systems of management including
privatisation, disinvestment, merger, management contracts and leasing”.
And as for projects that are already underway, those over five years old
would stand terminated, if so deemed by the ADB by December 2002,
no matter how far they have progressed or how extensively their benefits
accrue. The state is expected to submit reports to the ADB on its
production and trade statistics from time to time; this, when seen in
counterpoint to the total lack of transparency in the ADB-GoK
discussions lucidly illustrates the unequal terms of information exchange
being foisted on the state. The GoI is also required to open a “Deposit
Account” with the RBI for the express purpose of operating the ADB
loan; while all transactions with the ADB would be routed through this
account which is to be “established, managed and liquidated” in
accordance with terms and conditions satisfactory to the ADB, the state
government has failed to work in a withdrawal clause on its own behalf.
More over, public utilities would henceforth be run on market
principles with cost recovery and efficiency in delivery being pivotal
points. This would most likely manifest as a cess on education, health
and water and a tariff hike in the power sector; ‘uneconomic’ schools
would be closed and the Public Distribution System, Kerala’ pride, which
ought to be replicated in the rest of the country (Kannan 2003, Mooij
1996) would stand curtailed to a bare minimum. The new infrastructural
investments particularly in roads and water supply under the build-
operate-transfer (BoT) scheme would foist yet another burden on the
common people in the form of increased water tariffs, motorway tolls
and power tariff, as has happened in countries like the Philippines and
Vietnam.8  In effect, the MGP would mean a contraction in public
expenditure on the vital social sectors such as education, health and
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sanitation and a fresh drive for privatisation and enclosure of the
commons. It seems rather incongruous that a supposedly  “desirable”
policy package such as this should be hemmed in by so large an array of
compulsions and pre-conditions9 .
 Clearly, the multiple conditionalities that accompany the ADB
loan is such that the very democratic basis of the state stands threatened.
The MGP10   which promises to be a “paradigm shift in the way
Government transacts its business” would in reality translate into an
enforcement of the ADB diktat; and the bottom line is that the state
cabinet even surrenders its right to remove from office the bureaucrat/s
assigned responsibility for the MGP. Neither does the state ‘own’ the
reforms on the agenda nor is it capable of stemming the erosion of its
sovereignty. If the state has strained itself to create an impression that
the ADB bound modernisation programme would be implemented with
a “human face”, the very fact that hardly 4 per cent of the adjustment
cost was earmarked initially for poverty eradication  in the MGP - the
Kerala model of the twenty first century - has brought its efforts to
nought. This is notwithstanding the fact the state generated counterpart
fund of US$152 is to be added to the US$375 loan. But it is the inhuman
face of the ADB deal that surfaces when one watches the initial paltry
allocation of 4 per cent of the adjustment cost of the MGP for poverty
eradication dwindle even further in the final programme implementation
structure (Table 9). And this miniscule percentage is intended for
targeting, identifying, and improving the quality of poverty reduction
measures,  which seems quite the longest route to poverty eradication.
At a time when suicides and starvation deaths among plantation workers
and adivasis are on the rise11  and has dragged the Kerala model in mud,
one wonders what fresh effort is required to identify the poor. Perhaps
the ADB’s only contribution here would be to render redundant the
Below Poverty Line survey of the Government of Kerala which puts  the
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poverty level in rural Kerala at a shocking 37 per cent; more likely the
poverty line itself runs the risk of being re-drawn as part of the MGP.
Delivery improvements in the public utilities through “asset
renewal”, fiscal measures such as the preparation of Medium Term Fiscal
Reforms Programme and Fiscal Accountability Bill, the intension of
bringing ceilings on guarantees12   and other measures of social security
and social audit net work might give the state a face-lift; but it would
take a far more comprehensive programme involving a radical
redistribution of assets  and sustained employment opportunities to
make a tangible difference in the lives of the poor - an aspect that seems
to hold no significance for the ADB.
As things stand now, the public sector restructuring envisaged
would only aggravate the problems of the working class and those in
the lower and middle-income groups. For instance, given the fact that
nearly 98 per cent of employees of the Kerala State Cashew Development
Corporation Ltd (KSDC) are workers, any attempts to restructure this
concern would spell doom for them who would have no alternative
employment to turn to. Such apprehensions do find a place in the ADB-
supported Poverty Impact Assessment (PIA) of the loan13 ; it points out
that the curtailment of the total government expenditure would adversely
affect the poor, but avers that this adverse impact would be strongly
mitigated by two comprehensive initiatives as part of the MGP, namely
the Local self-government Action Plan and Anti-Poverty measures. The
PIA further seeks cover behind the poverty alleviation schemes, and, in
particular, Kudumbasree and micro credit enterprise programmes, blandly
ignoring the fact that women’s self-help groups are well on their way to
extinction in this globalised country. The fact that Kerala has always
been quite the most globally integrated region in India and that the
state’s own initiatives – including the women’s industries programme of
26Table 9:  Decomposition of Programme Implementation Costs ($ million)
Description in policy matrix Programme years
Amount Percent FY FY FY         FY
2003 2004 2005               2006
Revenue account deficit of KSEB to be
financed by Govt. 77.8 13.14 41.5 36.3 -  -
VAT system (Net CST impact) 71.3 12.05 - 27.4 23.6 20.3
Liabilities written off for KSEB and
 consequent loss to revenue 70.5 11.91 70.5 - - -
Funding social expenditure due to Treasury
Public Accounts closure  65.1 11.00 65.1  - -  -
Integrated personal and payroll management
systems implemented 5 0.84 1.2  3.8  0 0
Asset renewal system 103.7 17.52 8.3 12.4 41.5 41.5
Termination of unproductive infrastructure projects 29 4.90 - 6.2 10.4 12.4
Functional review unit 1.5 0.25 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Capacity building 9.7 1.64 0.4 3.1 3.1 3.1
MGP strategic implementation plan 1.5 0.25 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Social audit 4.1 0.69 - 1.2 1.4 1.4
Service delivery policy cell 0.3 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
cont'd...
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Upgradation of service standards in
Primary Health Centres 16.6 2.80  1 3.1 6.2  6.2
Citizen’s character 2.1 0.35 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7
Service delivery improvement in 3 services 9.3 1.57 - 4.1 3.1 2.1
Implementation of LSG action plan 17.3 2.92 2.1 15.1 - -
Rehabilitation of LSG water schemes as
transitional incentive  24.9 4.21 2.1 5.2  7.3  10.4
New rules for property tax assessment 1 0.17 - 1 - -
Capacity building in financial management for
LSGs and relevant community organizations  6.6 1.12 1.5  1  2.1  2.1
Poverty coordination unit 0.7 0.12 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Poverty database and maintenance 4.6 0.78 - 1.9 2.1 0.6
Pilot scheme for social safety net 14.5 2.45 - 8.3 4.1 2.1
SLPE reform 10 prioritized SLPEs 54.7 9.24 12.4 17.4 12.4 12.4
Total Budget 591.9 100 207 149.4 119.1 116.1
Amount of  ADB loan 300  100 100 50 50
Cofinancing  from Govt. of Netherlands 75  25.00a 25.00a 12.50b 12.50b
Source:  MGP strategy document, GOK Thiruvananthapuram.
KSEB = Kerala State Electricity Board, LSG = Local Self Govt., SLPE = State Level Public Enterprises, VAT = Value
Added Tax
a
 Committed b Proposed
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the 1980s - stand threatened by this is something that the PIA and the
MGP willfully ignore.
When the PIA maintains that the SLPE reforms “do not have any
fundamental conflict with the goal of poverty alleviation”, it grossly
underplays the experiences of other countries  wherein state withdrawal
had led to a loss of access to food, health, education and sanitation
facilities. Further, it fails to learn from the social chaos faced by the
sacked public sector workers in those countries that underwent public
sector restructuring.14  Above all, when the reforms treat retrenchment/
privatisation as an antidote to inefficiency, who is being punished - the
inefficient bureaucracy or the working class? That workers drawing a
monthly remuneration of hardly Rs 900 – as in the case of KSDC and as
in some other SLPEs – could rob public sector enterprises and utilities
of their profit is an argument that the enlightened public of Kerala
would find difficult to accept. If it were truly so, it may be worth noting
that many of the SLPEs were not meant for profit-making. And this is
precisely why the public sector employees of the state have rejected the
recommendations of the Enterprises Reform Committee (ERC)
constituted by the Government of Kerala, for whom restructuring of
SLPEs reads privatisation, disinvestment and closure.15  Incidentally
the ERC had submitted its “Approach Paper” on the 111 SLPEs in the
state in exactly 36 days! Its peremptory exhortation to restructure - an
euphemism for privatisation/closure - SLPEs like the Kerala State Drugs
and Pharmaceuticals Ltd and the Kerala Soaps and Oils Ltd without so
much an attempt to enquire into the causes of their failure, is hardly
justified in a state with an intensely health/hygiene conscious populace.
One can only conclude that the ERC has deliberately chosen to ignore
the origins of SLPEs in Kerala and their positive role in the social
development of the state, just as it glosses over the true nature of the
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private sector which has exhausted the state’s subsidised natural
resources, damaging its ecology and draining away its wealth16 .
Good Governance as the Bail Out Package?
Yet, the state tows the ADB line that it was bad governance that
bred the fiscal chaos, poor public delivery and rural/urban poverty in
the state. The solution then lies in the modified Washington Consensus
that the right policies - modernisation of governance in such a way that
there would be cuts in social security measures including pension and
retirement benefits, privatisation of strategic state enterprises and so on
- would act as catalysts for economic growth and fiscal sustainability
which in turn would ameliorate poverty. And in order to channel policies
according to plan, aid must be accompanied by multiple conditionalities
as per the lines of multilateral financial institutions. And it is for this
that good governance becomes mandatory, for the ADB in Kerala. The
ADB prescription for the malady of Kerala is “good governance” and it
claims that its approach to governance is “economic” rather than
“political” knowing fully well the political import of this economic
intervention.
 To this end then,  the state cabinet itself was assumed the nature
of an administrative reform committee of the  ADB: to evaluate the
progress made by the MGP and report back to the ADB. With the 10th
Plan document itself being carved out of the larger agenda of the ADB,
the State Planning Board thought it fit to drop the term ‘self’ from the
earlier ‘local self administration’. A senior state’s spokesperson even
went, as far as to say that democracy is an obstacle to development. And
the government plays along with the ADB, only too willing to accept its
package of conditionalities such as direct intervention in policy matters
including the approval of VRS and ESS to all categories of employees -
a Government that ought to be providing jobs for its educated
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unemployed masses has actually agreed to pare employment
opportunities down to an “efficient minimum”, having already done
away with many of the service benefits of the employees. More over, by
redefining one of the “core functions”17  of the state as policing, and by
disciplining labour through a variety of labour regimes, the class colour
of this new governance is gradually surfacing.
Secure in the knowledge that “the biggest risk comes from public
action against reform”,18  the ADB pressed ahead with its “good
governance” agenda. The state was prodded into instituting a massive
hike in power tariff in 2002, which was to earn for it the first tranche of
the ADB loan. The prophesied “public action” came in the form of a
massive mobilisation of various social sections; this included the
mainstream Left parties, who had bee been responsible for inviting the
ADB to the state in the first place. In spite of these protests, the state
succeeded in wresting a small victory, hiking up the withdrawn tariff
once again, but at a lesser rate. Further, an identical situation now prevails
with the state now reparing for yet another tariff hike in order to secure
the second trance of the ADB loan. The agenda for the power sector
reforms does not confine itself to tariff hikes alone, it further encapsulates
unbundling and corporatisation - the setting up of separate companies
for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and the
formation of an autonomous Tariff Regulatory Commission - all intended
to privatise the public sector giant. This is at a time when de-regulation
in the power sector in most of the countries has presented a dismal
picture with price gouging and hoarding. And the way in which the
power sector reforms have finally evolved, even denying a meagre
subsidy to the marginal farmers in Madhya Pradesh, has proved beyond
doubt the hidden agenda behind externally aided policy loans.19  What
is more interesting is that no effort has been made to seek viable
alternatives - such as an eco-friendly and decentralised electricity
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network - to the existing pattern of electricity generation and
distribution in the state.20  The heavy bias in allocation of high-tension
power in Kerala to a handful of enterprises with low levels of employment
and minimal linkage effects, the continuous patronage to power-sucking
units and so on are all being perpetuated while the possibility of setting
up mini-hydel projects or other in-house alternatives remain unexplored
(Kannan & Pillai 2002) - and that in a state which is criss-crossed with
rivers.   This is explicit in the experience of the APSEB, which was
subjected to WB-driven reforms in spite of its satisfactory performance
indicators. And even as the reform structure malfunctions, the message
still fails to go home: Kerala moves blindly ahead towards the very
same experience that befell Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.
Section IV:
Alternatives: Internal Resource Mobilisation
We would prefer to categorise the alternative sources of funds
into two: domestic and extra-domestic sources but both as part of internal
resource mobilisation from within the state and from within the country.
Domestic sources would again be divided into two:
(i) Locked Up Funds: Mandatory sources: revenue/surplus which
has already been generated in the economy but remains
inaccessible to the state.
(ii) Locked Up Potential Funds: whose full potential is yet to be
realised from within the state.
(iii) Extra-domestic Funds includes those resources that the state
could mobilise ‘from within’  but through negotiation/bargaining
with the Centre:
I shall explain each of these sources separately:
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Domestic Sources:
1. Locked Up Funds: Arrears Plus
 The major revenue raising sectors/departments of the state
government include commodity taxes/sales tax (72%),  state excise
(8%), stamps and registration (8%), taxes on vehicle (6.8%) and land
revenue (0.47%) and the forest sector (1.41%). Let us look at some of
these sectors. Only two broad categories of locked up funds are taken
into account here viz. the cumulative arrears and the other funds due to
the state as identified by the C & AG with  test cases. The total arrears
from various state departments alone works out to Rs 3071 crores (Table
10)21 . A mere 20 per cent of these arrears would suffice in place of the
second tranche of the ADB loan - Rs 600 crores. Is the government truly
incapable of collecting this 20 per cent? Obviously not. It is this
realisation that leads us to the subterranean agenda of the Centre as well
as the State - the implementation of neo-liberal reforms. What this boils
down to is that fiscal defict or no, the ADB/WB/IMF-driven structural
adjustments and neo liberal reforms are here  to stay unless they are
politically and economically countered.
In addition to this huge tax arrears, there is an ever increasing
revenue loss from the various generating sectors of the economy owing
to under-assessment of tax, incorrect computation of agricultural income
tax, exclusion of income from assessment including those of luxury
hotels and bars, non-realisation of potential value in forest produce and
so on. The revenue lost on account of this during 2001-02 works out to
more than Rs 500 crores; almost equivalent to the second tranche of the
loan that the state hankers after. It is true that a small portion of this
might have been recovered by the various departments, even so the
amount lost thus  would still be very high. Further, certain other taxes
such as the luxury tax have not been included herein; the luxury tax fell
short by 26 per cent in the year 1999-2000. It would be interesting to
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Table 10: Arrears of Tax/Non-tax Revenues
          (Rs. In Crores)
PARTICULARS ACTUALS (As on 31st March)
1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
1 2 3 4 5 6
A. TAX REVENUES
1. Land Revenue 71 60 67 69 68
(including taxes on Commercial Crops) (-15.49) (11.67) (2.98) (-1.44)
Agricultural Income Tax
2. Sales Tax 1106 1312 1364 1709 2232
(18.63) (3.96) (25.29) (30.60)
3. Electricity Duties 26 13 25 44 64
(-50) (92.31) (76) (45.45)
4. State Excise Duties 73 103 129 188 219
(41.1) (25.24) (45.74) (16.49)
5. Motor Vehicles Tax/Passenger & Goods Tax 270 288 334 343 386
(6.67) (15.97) (2.69) (12.54)
cont'd...
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B. NON-TAX REVENUES
i)  General Services 9 9 10 10 11
     Stationery (11.11) (10)
     Local Fund Audit 6 9 14 20 22
(50) (55.56) (42.86) (10)
ii) Economic Services
     Forest 8 4 6 20 10
(-50) (50) (233.33) (-50)
iii)  Fiscal Services
       Motor Vehicles 21 23 36 37 55
(9.52) (56.52) (2.78) (48.65)
TOTAL (A+B) 1593 1827 1988 2447 3071
(14.69) (8.81) (23.09) (25.5)
Sources:   State Finance Department, GoK; C & A G, Thiruvananthapuram. The percentage increase from the previous year
is given in the bracket.
PARTICULARS ACTUALS (As on 31st March)
1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
1 2 3 4 5 6
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note that some of luxury hotels in the state that unfailingly collect
luxury taxes from their customers/foreign tourists desist from remitting
the same to the state exchequer. In addition to the above two points of
leakages, the non-implementation of governmental stipulations in the
plantation sector and tax evasion with respect to certain commodities
like gold rob the state of its rightful due which we discuss under potential
sources of funds.
The freeing of locked up funds is therefore is absolutely necessary
for fiscal prudence in the state. It is uneconomic, undemocratic and
unethical to aim at fiscal reform without addressing the very same factors
responsible for the fiscal deficit. If we permit the sustenance of the
social structures of accumulation and thereby perpetuate  inequality in
the society, it will undermine precisely what we are trying to achieve.
This would feed back through the social structures as a whole in such a
way that state becomes the most accommodating agents of accumulation.
(ii) Potential Sources of Funds:
  According to the latest National Sample Survey on Consumption
Expenditure, 1999-2000 (55th round), Kerala has the highest  per capita
consumer expenditure in India,22  with its nearest rival being Punjab.
This shows the burgeoning of the consumer market in the state over the
last quarter of a century.  It is also true that the state ranks top among 15
major states in India with respect to the per capita general sales tax. But
here too, there is no room for complacence; in terms of tax-consumption
ratio, Kerala lags behind not only Punjab, but also the neighbouring
Tamil Nadu which comes only 4th as far as per capita consumer
expenditure is concerned (Table 11). Interestingly, the tax-consumption
ratio of Andhra Pradesh which ranks 10th in consumer expenditure is
almost the same as that of Kerala. Yet, the tax-consumption ratio of
Kerala has not improved commensurately with that of  other states.
36Table 11: Tax - Consumption Ratio, 1999-2000 (Selected states)
States Per capita Consumer       Rank Per capita Rank GST Consumer Rank
Expenditure GST (Rs.) Expenditure Ratio
1999-2000 (%)
Kerala 9843.55 1 1120.1 1 11.38 3
Punjab 9682.04 2 814.06 5 12.73 1
Tamil Nadu 8696.22 4 997.27 2 11.47 2
Andhra Pradesh 6572.96 10 740.76 7 11.27 4
Maharashtra 8502.47 5 915.11 3 10.76 5
Karnataka 7780.71 7 783.65 6 10.07 6
Note:- Only those states with two digit tax -consumption ratio are taken. GST includes all components of sales tax
except Central Sales Tax.
Sources: (1)  National Sample Survey Organization, Report on Household consumer expenditure 55th round, (1999-
       2000), Government of India.
(2)  A study of Budgets of States 2001-2002, Reserve Bank of India.
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When worked out Kerala’s potential Tax Consumption ratio in
the context of efficiency standards of selected states in India,  runs into
crores of rupees as additional income (Table 12).
It shows that if Kerala could achieve the same efficiency standard
as that of AP, it could increase its sales tax revenue by Rs 1724 crore.
Even if it could bring its tax level on par with that of neighbouring TN,
Kerala could generate an additional revenue of Rs500 crores per annum.
Yet, commodity taxes have not yet been tapped to their full potential.
Sales tax evasion is as high as 35 per cent (Rakhe, 2003) and it is
obvious that the richer sections of the society stand to benefit from this.
The case of specific commodities traded in the state such as gold makes
for strange reading.
Gold Market
Kerala is probably the richest market for gold in the country.  Yet,
the sales tax revenue realised from this sector is as low as rupees 32
crores a year; it should have been five to six times this amount, had it
been under stringent tax vigilance. Instead, tax evasion has reached
such heights that the analysis of the returns filed by the 79 gold merchants/
dealers (registered under the provisions of the Kerala General Sales Tax
Act, 1953)  in Thiruvananthapuram district show sales amounting to  a
mere one sovereign per day in the case of 89 per cent of the merchants;
the number  who submit returns of less than a quarter sovereign per day
is also significant (Table 13). Instead of plugging this leakage and
increasing its revenue23 , the state charge the sales tax of a mere 4 per
cent  on new gold ornaments and only a purchase tax of 1 per cent for
old gold ornaments. It is even pointed out by informed sources that if
one were to consider commodity-specific tax avoidance as in the case of
gold, the total tax leakage within the state would work out to a much
higher than the usual assessment.24  The state could do well to elucidate
the proposed tax reforms including Value Added Tax and how they
would tell upon the state economy as well as the autonomy of the state.25
38Table 12:  Kerala’s Potential T-C ratio (KPTC) to the efficiency standards of selected states and the potential sales tax
revenue
In relation to Kerala KPTC (%) of Per capita Per capita Actual Sale Per capita Potential Total
Kerala Potential Actual Sale Tax  Balance Balance Potential
Sale Tax Tax(Rs) of (Rs crores) (Rs) for  Sale tax (Actual +
Revenue(Rs)   Kerala  of Kerala  Kerala (In crores) Total
of Kerala of Kerala Balance)
Punjab (12.73) 12.94 1273.76 1120.10 3566.24 153.66 489.23 4055.48
T. Nadu (11.47) 12.98 1277.69 157.59 501.74 4067.99
A P (11.27) 16.88 1661.59 541.49 1724.03 5290.27
Maharashtra (10.76) 12.46 1226.51 106.41 338.79 3905.04
Karnataka (10.07) 12.74 1253.08 132.98 423.39 3989.63
Note:  GST includes all components of sales tax except Central Sales Tax.
Sources:  (1)  National Sample Survey organization, Report on Household consumer expenditure 55th round  (1999-
2000), Government of India.
(2) A study of Budgets of States 2001-2002, Reserve Bank of India.
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Plantation Sector:
 Yet another potential source of funds is the plantation sector in
the state. The non-implementation of revised lease rents in plantations
leads to a loss of at least 500 crores of rupees per annum, allowing the
big planters to amass huge profits; this has been repeatedly confirmed
by the Assurance Committees of the State Legislative Assembly. Let us
take the case of large plantations in the state with a focus on the lease
rent  as applied/misapplied/unapplied to the large plantation sector.
Under both the Quit Rent and Lease Rent, the actual rent amount is (i)
abysmally small; and (ii) there is absolutely no uniformity in rent
collection across the planting companies. For instance, Tata-Tea, the
largest integrated plantation in the world, with its 50,000 acre-Empire
in the state, pays only Rs50 per acre; there are other estates that pay a
mere Rs25 per acre; what is more, A.V.Thomas & Company is required to
pay only Rs5.30!. The benevolent government, however, did not forget
Table 13: Per day equivalent sales (Grams) as reported to the
Government
Grams No. of Gold Merchants / Dealers Percent
(small and medium)
Below 2 31 39.2
2 - 4 23 29.1
4 - 6 10 12.7
6 - 8 6 7.6
Above 8 9 11.4
Total 79 100.0
Total Number of days taken into account: 156 days
1 gram @ Rs. 500
Source: Computed from the records of the Sales Tax Department, GoK.
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to impose as high an amount as Rs1300 per acre on the state-owned
Plantation Corporation (an aspect that never comes into the picture
when one talks about the losses that these public sector enterprises
make in their daily business).
 The Government does realise the economic losses incurred due
to such irregularities - and has attempted to rectify the same to a certain
extent as  is reflected in the Kerala Land and Leases(Modification of
Right) Act, 1980. This was further modified in the year 1990. Yet the
government failed to realise either a hike a hike in the lease rent or to
unify the same across the corporate planting companies/estates (The
law was published as a special Gazette in 1990, after a decade of lapse,
that too, did not improve the situation). More than a decade later, these
planting companies/estates remain untouched by the state. The State
Assurance Committee chaired by Nalakath Sooppy, in their report
submitted to the tenth Kerala Legislative Assembly in November 1996
worked out that due to this alone, the state loses nearly 500 crores of
rupees per annum.26  This was further endorsed by the seventh report
submitted in 1997 led by Prof A.V.Thamarakshan.  A genuinely concerned
state Government could collect the arrears - in appropriate instalments -
from 1980 onwards, which would provide the exchequer not less than
Rs 11,000 crores; if the arrears are worked out  from 1990 alone,  the
amount due to the state would work out to no less than Rs 6,000 crores.
Well, what about collecting the same at least from the current year
onwards?. If one were to consider these potential sources of funds along
with the tax arrears mentioned earlier, the total amount would add up to
more than Rs 4000 crores - more than equavalent to the total ADB loan
- then a mere 15 per cent as against 20 per cent as worked out earlier of
this would suffice in place of the second tranche of the ADB loan.
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Extra- ‘Domestic’ Sources of Funds: Workers' Remittances and
Market Borrowing
Other possibilities of resource mobilisation which however lie
outside the purview of the state and are ruled by extraneous forces
include the newly introduced services tax, Central transfers, Workers'
remittances and market borrowings. With its economic performance being
primarily driven by the services sector, Kerala could bargain with the
Centre for the right to levy taxes on more and more services. Given the
fact that the Central transfers to the state(s) are on the decline, and that
the state like Kerala has been penalised for its progress 27  through an
alteration in Criteria and Weightage of the Eleventh Finance Commission
- Kerala loses more than Rs3600 crores for the plan period of 2000-05 -
one would expect the state to be compensated by  developmental/
concession loans and special grants from the Centre. But the state has
been denied even this facility with the Netherlands’ grant being
apportioned in 70:30 loan-grant ratio. However, by recommending that
the TFC  “give up the criteria of backwardness”, the state has deliberately
overlooked specifc nature of Kerala’s backwardness as reflected in its
pockets of poverty - among adivasis, plantation workers and fisherfolk
for instance.
The recent World Bank report, “Global Development Finance
(2003) puts India at the top of list of developing countries with 10
billion US dollars of remittances from its migrant workers (Ratha 2003);
Kerala’s contribution to this stable source of foreign exchange could
very well be significant. Earlier this amount was estimated at Rs 15,000
crores per year (Zachariah, Kannan & Rajan 2002; Kannan & Hari 2002).
The state should have found ways to attract a significant portion of this
foreign exchange from it had it politically negotiated with the Centre
and offered an interest rate nearly as much as the state is bound to give
to the Central Government  loans. The domestic savings of the state -
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including the foreign exchange remittances - in the scheduled banks
works out to around Rs. 60,000 crores of rupees, of which around rupees
25,000 crores are given as credits to the state. The low credit-deposit
ratio in the state as against a higher CD ratio in other states/metropolis
is often a pointer to the route of surplus drain from the state which means
“savings from the state were being  used for lending and investment
elsewhere in the country” as pointed out by the state government itself.
It is to be acknowledged that a state/region denied  of its own surplus for
reinvestment can never hope to prosper. However, the state failed to
work out mechanisms to incorporate such issues in developing new
criteria for devolution from the Centre. Knowing quite well that the
Centre’s investment in Kerala keeps declining - from 3.06 per cent in
1970 to 2.33 in 1980 and further down to 1.69 in 2000 (as against an
increasing contribution of malayali migrants to Indian foreign exchange)
- and that it would continue to decline as and when mega investments
like the Rs 54,000 crore Golden Quadrangle28  - come through, the state
ought to have worked out new negotiations with the TFC for favourable
terms of resource transfer.
A detailed look at the market borrowing of the Government of
Kerala during 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 reveals the immense
possibility of internal resource mobilisation. During the fiscal year 2002-
03, the State had issused  KSDL six times, three times each for financing
the five year plan/ ‘development activities’ and  for swapping its debts.
Altogether, the state was able to float development loans worth over
1237 crores, of which, after deducting the amount used for debt swapping
worth 343 crores, the amount the state was able to direct for financing
the five year plan and development activities together was Rs 894
crores.29  During the year 2003-04,  the government issued loans on
eight occasions, four each for swapping debts and to finance
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Table 14:  Purpose-wise Market Borrowing (Rs. in crores)
Sl.No Nomenclature Rate of Development Debt Swap
Interest & Five Year Plan
1 KSDL 2011 9.56 289.59 ______
23.08.2001
2. KSDL 2011 8.37 138.96 ______
20.12.2001
3. KSDL 2001 8.30 276.42 ______
28.01.2002
4. KSDL 2012 8.00 61.15 ______
13.03.2002
5 KSDL 2012
(11.04.2002) 8 225.00 ———
6 KSDL 2012
(19.08.2002) 7.8 251.06 ———
7 KSDL 2012
(18.11.2002) 6.93 220.00  ———
8 KSDL 2012
(23.12.2002) 6.8 197.39   ———
9 KSDL 2013
(25.02.2003) 6.95  ——- 258.00
10 KSDL 2013
(12.03.2003) 6.75 ——- 85.96
11 KSDL 2013
(12.05.2003) 6.4 395.01 ———
12 KSDL 2013
(12.06.2003) 6.35  ——— 168.01
13 KSDL 2013
(30.07.2003) 6.2%  ——— 192.04
14 KSDL 2013
(13.08.2003) 6.02 250.00   ———-
15 KSDL 2015
(25.08.2003) 6.2  ———- 192.01
16 KSDL 2015
(13.10.2003) 5.85 114.56 ———-
17 KSDL 2017
19.01.2004 5.85 _______ 118.98
18 KSDL
21.2.2004 5.85 300.00 ______
Total 2719.14 1015.00
Grand Total 3734.14
Sources: Department of Finance, GoK.
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‘development activities’. The government was able to redirect Rs 1059
crores towards development activities out of the total loans issued worth
Rs.1730.61 crores.30  After assuming power, the present government had
issued developments bonds for 18 times and of the total amount of
Rs. 3734.14 crores mobilised, around 73 per cent (Rs 2719.14 crores)
was spent on financing five year plans and ‘development activities’ – in
effect, the major share of the same went towards the disbursal of salary
and the meeting of other  revenue expenditure – and the rest  (Rs 1015
crores) on debt swapping. A large majority of the development bonds
issued by the government were bought by none other than the state
urban co-operative banks. This points to the desirability of two policy
measures that could have been successfully adopted by the state vis. (I)
Market borrowing within the RBI regulations as a viable strategy of
internal resource mobilisation as the state has attempted to a certain
extent and (2) mobilisation of loans from co-operative/commercial banks
in preference to high cost loans from multilateral agencies like the ADB.
Considering the fact that the state has been issuing development
bonds every two months (more specifically once in 50 days upto February
2004), and has been continually raising money from the co-operative
banks it would seen appropriate that the actual use of these funds be
made transparent. More importantly, the mopping up of development
loans by the Co-operative and other Banks implies a deprivation of the
public of their own valuable funds for  directly productive activities or
for disbursal towards socially desirable programmes such as
rescheduling/ waiving of farmers' debts. The rationale behind such a
diversion of funds is something that the public of Kerala must debate
upon particularly when the state has been exhibiting a low CD ratio.
Who Stands to Gain?
 At the other end of the scale, who stands to gain from all this
restructuring and modernising is all too clear; the massive allocations
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for capacity building, training, and computerisation speak for
themselves. More over, there being a continuing emphasis on large-
scale infrastructure projects and modernising government, the ADB is
very particular that all procurement – engineering technologies for civil
works, software and hardware, goods and related services  - will be
through “normal commercial practices in case of procurement by the
private sector, or prescribed procedures acceptable to ADB in case of
procurement by the public sector, having due regard for the principles
of economy and efficiency”.  It would imply that the ADB contracts
would be awarded through internationally advertised competitive
bidding with the caveat that bidding would be confined to the powerful
donor countries of the ADB such as the United States, Japan, Germany,
Canada, Australia, France and Korea.31  The past performance of ADB-
tied procurements reveal that most of the procurement goes to the world’s
biggest corporate capital in the donor countries such as Mitsui and Co,
Mitsubishi of Japan, Cooper Rolls and Raytheon Company Electronic
Systems and Cargill Fertilizer of the US, Siemens of Germany and Balfour
Beatty of the UK(Adams 2000:20-31).  The BoT envisaged in the
building of infrastructure such as express high ways would further open
up the state to the machinations of multinational BoT companies.
And with respect to grant/loan-tied Technical Assistance, the
beneficiaries are again a handful of the donor countries particularly the
U.S., UK, Canada and Australia; it was to the PDP Australia (P) Ltd that
the consultancy on fiscal reforms in Kerala went. The Australian
Treasurer’s report to Parliament on the ADB for 1998-99 states that
“ADB-financed contracts provide sizable commercial opportunities for
Australian firms and can be stepping stones to further work in developing
countries in Asia and the Pacific”.32  The ADB thus plays a lucrative
source of procurement of contracts for multinationals from donor
countries, with local capital as junior partners. Not surprisingly, the
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genesis of many of these corporate capital which have won ADB Technical
Assistance contracts, may be traced back to policy-based lending with
huge investments in infrastructure; and concomitantly, a new genre of
comprador bureaucrats and academic consultants have been let loose in
recipient countries/states like Kerala. As the class constituents of the
emerging governmentality would in no way be different from the existing
one, the social structures of accumulation in the state would be the other
major stake holders; the marginalised sections of society  would gain
the least, they would instead be the hardest hit in the entire process of
neo-liberal development processes.
Section  V
Concluding Observations
 The privileging of internal resources over external finance is not
only the most democratic but also the politically correct option. And the
possibilities for internal resource mobilisation in the state are many. The
swelling middle and upper class income brackets in the state signal a
vibrant consumer market elevating Kerala to the status of the  highest per
capita consumer expenditure in India. Yet, commodity taxes have not yet
been tapped to their full potential. Most importantly, there is an ever
increasing revenue loss in various revenue generating sectors of the
economy owing to under-assessment of tax, incorrect computation of
agricultural income tax, exclusion of income from assessment including
those of luxury hotels and bars, non-realisation of potential value in
forest produce and so on. This is in addition to the huge arrears of tax the
state would have gathered in had it shown the perspicacity to vacate the
numerous stay orders on them including those instituted by itself. The
non-implementation of revised lease rents in plantations also leads to a
loss of crores of rupees per annum. A quick estimate of such locked up
funds – tax arrears of Rs 3070 crores plus other potential sources of funds
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- in the state comes up to more than Rs4000 crores of rupees, an amount
more than equivalent to the ADB loan. Yet, the class bias of the state
blinds it to such encrypted sources of funds which in Kerala help foster
social structures of accumulation constituted by groups of large business
traders, owners of luxury hotels, big planters, gold merchants, liquor barons,
forest contractors and so on. They form multiple nodes in the power-
chain, which ultimately winds its way to the state apparatus.
As the state is inherently biased in favour of such power relations,
huge amounts of accumulated funds remain frozen, their flow to the
state exchequer arrested, leading to what could be called a state-
‘augmented/patronised’ fiscal crisis. Had the state been able to find
economic and democratic ways of mobilising the already generated
surplus or whatever is mandatorily due to it both from the classes of
accumulation as well as the public, it could have substantially expanded
the productive base of its economy with sustainable fiscal balances that
also without borrowing wild from the ADB. The malayali-world would
do well to realise that Japan became what it is today through the
mobilisation of its domestic savings in its era of post-War devastation.
The transformation of China into an industrial giant in the current climate
of globalisation has quite a lot to do with the money spent by the
overseas Chinese diaspora – about 70 per cent of the FDI in China
originates from them, particularly those in Southeast Asia. The state
should also realise that the workers’ remittances constitute a major share
of total investment in Mexico, Egypt and in  nearby Mali (Ratha 2003;
Martin, Martin, and Weil 2002). But the ADB has again (and World
Bank)  outmaneuvered  the Centre  glibly walking away with permission
to raise up to $250 million in rupees from the Indian debt market (The
Hindu, Sept 24, 2002). Enron, the architect of the Maharashtra power
debacle  too mobilised its funds from within! At least Kerala could well
have plugged the drain of its resources, resisted unfavourable
conditionalities and initiated a development/reform agenda including
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what this author would  call “internally-driven globalisation”. The
development ideology of the state should read thus: previlege internal
finance over external finance;  organise production and exchange aiming
primarily for the domestic market; strive to assure food security to the
people of the state; promote redistributin of resources such as land to
provide permanent livelihood to historically disadvantage communities
and to improve social quality of life.
As has been pointed out earlier in the paper, debt sustainability in
Kerala had become a non-viable proposition by the late 90s precipitating
what is called debt overhang. It is also our contention that the  ADB loan
would only work to accentuate the financial strain on the state leading
it blindfolded into an internal debt trap. Once the entire loan amount
has been accepted, contractual debt servicing obligations would fall
within the range of Rs3000-3700 million for about a decade, with the
existing debt servicing cost of Rs 3000 crores taking the annual
repayment rate to the range of rupees 3300-3700 crores. How the state
would stand up to such a financial challenge remains to be seen.  The
increasing reliance on external finance (not directly productive) in
preference to the mobilisation and utilisation of domestic resources
would extract a hefty toll indeed particularly with respect to social
sector expenditure. Kerala had a commendable social allocation ratio of
41 per cent in 1990-91 as against per cent for India. But with the neo-
liberal reforms in Kerala, this ratio dwindled to 35 per cent in the mid
90’s and further down to 33 per cent in 1999-2000, far below the UNDP
standard. If the Kerala government were to adhere to ADB-driven
governance, it would culminate in social de-investment,
“commodification” of critical sectors such as education and health and
thereby a reversion of whatever remains of the Kerala model of social
development: what Karl Polanyi would have called “disembedding”33
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from social bonds and civic engagements, vulnerable social sections
being the hardest hit.
 In addition to social de-spending and the mounting of social
debt, the ADB loan is likely to strike at the very roots of democracy in
the state.  The MGP and Fiscal Reforms (MGP), as is broadly called,
which promises to be a “paradigm shift in the way Government transacts
its business” would in reality translate into an enforcement of the ADB
diktat. With the imposition of its “common policy matrix”, the very
socio-political structure of Kerala would witness an upheaval –
privatisation of PSUs, enhanced cost recovery for public utilities
including  health, education and water, flexibilisation of labour,
retrenchment and redeployment of “excess” staff in the name of
rationalisation, suspension of fresh recruitment, deregulation and
increased market “openeness” are some of the radical alterations that
would altogether reverse the social development model the state has
thus far been proud of. Though there is no gainsaying that the “asset
renewal” and “modernising governance” proposed by the ADB might
bring in a few positive changes - an aspect that has not been covered in
this paper - it cannot be overemphasised that it would all be at
considerable social and political cost. Those bedazzled by the ADB’s
Poverty Impact Assessment have obviously missed these hidden costs.
In practice, the ADB prescription would result in a watering down of the
recently decentralised governance, whatever be its shortcomings, and
in a stalling of the process of prioritised decentric development.  In its
haste to get the second tranche from the ADB, the state has already
initiated certain policies such as passing of Fiscal Responsibility Bill
and the Bill seeking to fix a cap on state guarantees, reduction in the
rate of conveyance such as stamp duty, registration fee and identification
and abolition/redeployment of “surplus” staff and so on. The latter has
already woken the people of the state to the other side of the package;
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the ADB on the other hand, continues to tighten the noose around the
state’s autonomy.34
 Although the state has accepted the first tranche of Rs 600 crore,
it could just as well withdraw totally from  ADB package. What is required
is a concerted effort towards an internal resource mobilisation which
would liberate the state from its commitment to the high-conditionality
ADB loan. It would take just 20 per cent or less of the locked up funds to
save the stae from the ignominy of seeking the second tranche of Rs 600
crores from ADB; further, the possibility of additional internal/domestic
resource mobilisation is also very high.  It must be pointed out at this
juncture that  the Centre has actually begun to prepay certain high cost
loans from multilateral agencies as part of its effort to reduce the burden
of interest and to rein in the fiscal deficit. This is a direct consequence of
an increase in the country’s forex reserves, which rose to a record high of
$103.8 billion in January 2004. The Government of India has already
prepaid loans aggregating $1.67 billion to World Bank and another
$1.3 billion to the ADB in the last financial year ended March 31, 2003.
Yet another round of prepayment worth $1.5 billion is envisaged in the
current financial year. Paradoxically enough, India may have to bear
foreclosure charges imposed by the World Bank against prepayment of
loans. Not having had the foresight to include an appropriate withdrawal
clause India is now faced with this threat; with respect to the ADB loan
too, both the Centre as well as the state failed to adopt any such safety
measures. It should also to be noted that India has now become a lender-
member of the Financial Transaction Plan (FTP) of the IMF to meet the
Balance of Payment (BoP) needs of other countries; it has already
contributed $291 million to the FTP in 2003. One would have thought
that a developing country like India would use its forex reserves more
judiciously -  to plough it back into its domestic economy, to increase
the steadily declining public investment, to correct the fiscal deficits
and to bring down its huge external debt. Kerala and other ADB-focal
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states such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Sikkim on their part
would do well to re-examine their stand on the ADB and on Centre-State
relations and to first, stop further borrowing from the ADB and not to
pursue with the ADB policy package, and, second, to renounce the path
of externally-driven neo-liberal reforms. Otherwise, the state would find
itself ‘mortgaged’ for generations to come.
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Notes
1  As in the case of  the power sector reforms in the Philippines (Bello 2000,
2001; Criss 2002), the transport project in Sri Lanka, Pakistan’s Access to
Justice Programme (Ercelawn & Nauman 2003) or the Greater Mekong
Sub-regional Economic Reforms or the Klong Kan wastewater treatment
project in Samut Prakan in east Thailand. One of the prime movers of the
ADB, Japan also has much to answer for as far as its Overseas Develop-
ment Assistance is concerned, as is evident from the violation of human
rights in the case of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in lndia  and the Koto
Pandgjang Dam in Indonesia (Kunibert & Singer 1996:117).   Probably,
the ADB’s most infamous involvement was with Vietnam, which it ini-
tially refused financial aid in keeping with the U.S embargo; and when it
did deign to extend its policy loan to Vietnam in 1993, it only turned out to
be a burden. Many such “uncivil engagements” of the ADB in the neigh-
bouring countries and within the country have come under focus.  This
has consistently been brought out by the Focus on the Global South, a
Bangkok-based NGO see, http://www.focusweb.org. The recent mass
demonstration against the ADB which took place in Chiang Mai, Thailand
in May 2000 during the ADB’s 33rd annual conference by thousands of
farmers, students and non-governmental organisations (Tadem 2003) firmly
underscores the  unpopularity enjoyed by the bank.
2 While in power, it  was the LDF that had initiated a dialogue with the ADB in
1996 and later in 1998, accepting in  spirit  the neo-liberal agenda of a restruc-
turing of public utilities based on market principles and  private    participation.
It had also submitted a Concept Paper to the Government of India (see the
document 1 of 8, dt 15 October 1998, GoK)  on the basis of its discussions
with the ADB mission in 1998 towards such reforms. Though the ADB had
been keen on financing a ‘communist government’ it had insisted on a political
consensus on the future course of action as a pre-requisite for its selection of
Kerala as the focal state, just as it had selected Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh in
1996 and 1997 respectively.   The opposition led by the present Chief Minister
A.K Antony had been in no way averse to the ADB package, assuring the
ADB mission that it recognised the need for ‘pragmatism’ and fully supported
ADB’s reform agenda in the state.
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3 For the impact of Indo-Sri Lankan trade agreement on Indian economy,
see K.N.Harilal and K.J. Joseph, “India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Accord”,
EPW, May 27, 1999: 750-53.
4 For a brief survey of  debt overhang in developing countries, see Jeffrey
D Sachs,  1989.
5 The latest figure is taken from Memorandum presented to the Twelfth
Finance Commission, GoK, 2003.
6 It is to be noted that there are no formal norms by which a debt is deemed
unsustainable for it is something that varies depending on the resource
position of the state. For a discussion on the various dimensions of the
debt sustainability, see Raj Kumar, 1999.
7 For instance the ADB, and indeed the GoI, have succeeded in assuring
such a cross-conditionality with respect to the grants from the Netherlands
to Kerala, which comes through the Centre with its significant portion as
a loan.
8 See Wyatt, A. 2002.
9 For an analysis of the implications of conditionalities of policy loans in
other countires, see Jeffrey, 1989, Killick with Gunatilaka & Marr, 1998.
It should be noted that multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the
ADB are hardly open to analysis as their policies on access to information
are far from democratic, see Guttal, 2002. It is also worth mentioning that
even in Kerala the details regarding the terms and conditions of the loan
were released only under public pressure, see K Ravi Raman 2003.
10 MGP: A  Strategy Document, GoK, 2002.
11 Ravi Raman 2003; Bijoy & Ravi Raman 2003.
12 Contingent liabilities do not form a part of the debt burden of the states.
However, in the event of default by the borrowing entity - which has of
late become common - the state will be required to meet the debt servicing
obligations. Though many states have taken steps to place ceilings on
guarantees, Kerala, has not so far chalked out any statutory and adminis-
trative ceiling.
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13 Poverty Impact Assessment of the Policy Based Loan – Kerala, ADB File,
State MGP  Office, GoK, Thiruvananthapuram, 2002:8-9
14 The public sector workers who were sacked as part of neo-liberal reforms
finally had to encroach on forests as in Brazil and Peru or turned to illegal
drug production as in Bolivia, see Susan George, 1992.
15 GoK, 2002.
16 For one such instance with respect to the former Gwalior Rayons at
Mavoor, see Rammohan & Ravi Raman, 1988: 1359-64; 1989:16-17.
17 See the MGP: Strategic Implementation Plans, GoK, 2002.
18 ADB File, State MGP Office, GoK, Thiruvananthapuram.
19 The Energy Reforms Bill that has been passed in Madhya Pradesh at the
instance of the ADB has meant that marginal farmers have stopped receiv-
ing electricity at concessional rates and for many poor families, this has
also meant the loss of the only electricity connection in their households,
see Narsalay, 2002.
20 For a pro-reform argument, see V.Santhakumar, “The impact of distribu-
tion of costs and benefits of non-reform - a case study of power sector
reforms in Kerala between 1996 and 2000", Economic and Political Weekly,
38, 2, 147-154.
21 The amount as calculated may vary depending on the items and sectors
involved; what is of significance to us is that it would take only a small
portion of what is due to the Government to save the state from falling into
a debt trap.
22 This is also in tally broadly with the sharp increase in the percentage of
households in the Higher Income group (Rs >77,000  per year) with 21
per cent in 1995-96 as against hardly 5 per cent in 1989-90. It is also to be
noted that Kerala had the highest percent of low income households in
1990 with 83 per cent  of households with an income of 25,000/- per year.
It, however, improved its position in 1995-96 and ranked seventh. With
respect to the lower middle class (Rs 25,000 – 77,000), it improved the
position with 12 per cent of households in 1989-9- to 28 per cent in 1995-
96 (Natarajan, 1998:13-15).
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23 With the advent of e-commerce, these gold merchants have found a way to
operate incognito; reliable sources point  out that hour to hour manipula-
tion of web sites has become a new method of dodging the sales tax
officials. However, it would be advisable to probe deeper into the matter
before making further comments.
24 An analysis of sector-specific, commodity-centred tax leakage would surely
be of much benefit for policy planning.
25 The World Bank initiated VAT has found favour with the MNCs and big
capital at large. Exactly how it coincides with the interests of the state is
worth examining. Moreover,  the introduction of VAT would lead to a
macro-integration of markets. The exact position of the state economy
relative to such an integrated market would be worth analysing.
26 For details see Legislative Assurance Committee Reports, dt 14 Novem-
ber 1996 and 29 July 1997 submitted to the Tenth Legislative Assembly,
published by the Government of Kerala.; Also see Sebastian 2002.
27 For a discussion on 11th and 12th Finance Commission, see K P Kannan
and R Mohan (2003) and K K George and K K Krishnakumar (2003).
28 Golden Quadrangle is part of expanding the capacity of the National
Highways connecting Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata. It does not mean
that the author subscribes either to the proposed Golden Quadrangle or the
River Inter-Linking projects which might well precipitate widespread eco-
logical and political conflicts.  What is important is that Kerala seems to be
sidelined, whenever the Central Government inititates major investments.
29 These details are collected from the Department of Finance, GoK.
30 The inability often pleaded by the state in mobilising funds from the
domestic market/commercial/nationalised banks holds no water as has
been proved in the case of Punjab State Electricity Board, which was quite
successful in issuing secured debentures.
31 Japan and the U.S are the two most influential countries in the 61-member
ADB with each owning a subscription of around 16 per cent of the Ordi-
nary Capital Reserve translating into an almost equal voting power of
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13.533 and 13.105 per cent respectively. Despite the fact that Japan has a
much higher share of 52.3 per cent in the cumulative fund as against 11.2
of the United States, the latter wields more power in foreign policy
matters. Further, advanced countries jointly account for more than half of
the total voting power. India which joined the ADB at its inception in 1966
itself, has 6.667 per cent of the ADB’s total subscribed capital with a
voting power of 5.718 per cent, see Kappagoda, 1995.
32 Cited in Chris Adams, op cit.
33 Polanyi 1944.
34 The resistance encountered by the two-member ADB evaluation team
who came to Kerala in the second week of November 2003 for evaluation
of the progress made under the MGP is only a continuation of a year long
anti-ADB campaign in the state, see K Ravi Raman, 2003.
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Appendix 1: State wise revenue and fiscal deficit (percent of NSDP)
1990-91 1995-96 1999-00
RD FD RD FD RD FD
Andhra Pradesh 0.46 2.79 1.03 3.36 2.34 5.16
Bihar 2.17 6.11 2.81 4.09 5.45 9.37
Gujarat 2.51 6.42 0.34 2.71 2.75 6.01
Haryana 0.16 3.04 1.35 3.84 3.02 5.76
Karnataka 0.33 2.3 -0.12 2.76 1.71 3.29
Kerala 2.67 5.06 1.15 3.71 3.88 5.49
Madhya Pradesh 0.62 3.17 0.83 2.85 2.93 4.45
Maharashtra 0.09 2.65 0.43 2.93 4.11 6.03
Orissa 0.19 5.98 3.38 5.85 6.24 9.35
Punjab 3.36 7.67 1.31 3.98 5.74 7.93
Rajasthan -0.76 2.45 1.67 6.13 5.92 8.85
Tamil Nadu 1.74 3.55 0.44 1.79 3.09 4.16
Uttar Pradesh 2.16 5.39 2.29 4.28 4.68 7.24
West Bengal 3.03 4.85 1.86 4.02 6.71 9.06
Major states 1.33 4.18 1.17 3.5 4.06 6.34
Special category
states -0.4 8.04 -2.53 4.65 3.7 10.69
All states 0.93 3.3 0.73 2.6 2.94 4.75
Notes: RD – Revenue Deficit, FD – Fiscal Deficit, All state is the sum
of 25 states, For states, major states and special states it is ratio
to NSDP new series. For all states it is ratio to GDP new series.
Source: Rao, 2002.
58Appendix 2:  Revenue Budget of Kerala, Percentage Change over previous year, 1991-2 to 1999-2000
1991- 1992- 1993- 1994- 1995- 1996- 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000 2001 2002- Average
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Own Tax Revenue 24.9 12.7 24.3 19.4 20.8 15.2 15.5 3.3 11.7 13.0 12.3 14.1 15.6
Own Non-tax Revenue 12.4 19.0 15.7 22.6 35.1 -4.1 7.5 1.0 -4.8 24.2 8.6 26.3 13.6
Own Revenue (1+2) 23.2 13.5 23.2 19.8 22.6 12.6 14.5 3.0 9.9 14.1 11.9 15.3 15.3
Share in central taxes 18.5 19.2 9.4 11.6 23.7 19.8 2.3 8.7 11.1 3.3 19.5 12.1 13.3
Grants from the centre -0.1 26.8 8.0 25.8 -25.9 4.6 61.9 -23.3 12.1 -9.7 24.6 48.9 12.8
Total Revenue
Receipts (3+4+5) 18.7 16.4 18.2 19.0 16.2 13.3 15.8 1.1 10.4 9.9 14.2 17.3 14.2
Revenue Expenditure 13.9 13.7 17.4 18.0 15.0 16.5 21.4 12.0 25.3 2.7 -0.2 17.2 14.4
RD as a Percentage
of FD 45.3 46.1 39.7 36.1 30.9 41.7 46.3 67.4 79.8 81.1 79.7 — 51.72
Note: 2001-02 – revised estimates, 2002-03 – budget estimates.
Source: CMIE, Public Finance, February 1999 & March 2002.
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Appendix 3: Debt servicing cost (DSC) as a % of TRR, OR, TRE and
NSDP in middle income states (Rs. in crores)
Year DSC DSC/TRR DSC/OR DSC/TRE DSC/NSDP
1991-1992 643.09 13.84 21.16 12.90 2.19
1993-1994 916.61 15.01 23.47 14.42 2.16
1995-1996 1320.01 16.91 25.61 15.74 2.24
1996-1997 1560.52 17.74 27.49 14.95 2.33
1997-1998 1830.24 18.03 27.52 16.27 2.41
1999-2000 2802.30 23.42 34.79 17.42 2.85
TRE= total revenue expenditure, TRR= total revenue receipts, DSC=
interest payments & servicing of debt, NSDP= net state domestic product,
OR= state’s own revenue.
Source: computed from RBI bulletins.
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Appendix 4:  Consolidated Repayment in the Pipeline (Rs in million)
LOAN $775 Rs. 37200
AMOUNT Million Million
Rate of Interest @ 10.5%
Grant   30%
20 AnnualRepayment}
 Instalments
Rs. in Million
1st Loan 2nd Loan 3rd Loan
Year Principal Interest Principal Interest Principal Interest Total Total Total Annual
Principal interest repayable
2003 105.00 441.00 168.00 705.60 273.00 1146.60      1419.60
2004 210.00 870.98 168.00 687.96 168.00 705.60 546.00 2264.54 2810.54
2005 315.00 1289.93 168.00 670.32 168.00 687.96 651.00 2648.21 3299.21
2006 315.00 1256.85 168.00 652.68 168.00 670.32 651.00 2579.85 3230.85
2007 315.00 1223.78 168.00 635.04 168.00 652.68 651.00 2511.50 3162.50
2008 455.00 1190.70 392.00 617.40 168.00 635.04 1015.00 2443.14 3458.14
2009 595.00 1142.93 392.00 576.24 392.00 617.40 1379.00 2336.57 3715.57
2010 735.00 1080.45 392.00 535.08 392.00 576.24 1519.00 2191.77 3710.77
2011 735.00 1003.28 392.00 493.92 392.00 535.08 1519.00 2032.28 3551.28
cont'd...
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2012 735.00 926.10 392.00 452.76 392.00 493.92 1519.00 1872.78 3391.78
2013 735.00 848.93 392.00 411.60 392.00 452.76 1519.00 1713.29 3232.29
2014 735.00 771.75 392.00 370.44 392.00 411.60 1519.00 1553.79 3072.79
2015 735.00 694.58 392.00 329.28 392.00 370.44 1519.00 1394.30 2913.30
2016 735.00 617.40 392.00 288.12 392.00 329.28 1519.00 1234.80 2753.80
2017 735.00 540.23 392.00 246.96 392.00 288.12 1519.00 1075.31 2594.31
2018 735.00 463.05 392.00 205.80 392.00 246.96 1519.00 915.81 2434.81
2019 735.00 385.88 392.00 164.64 392.00 205.80 1519.00 756.32 2275.32
2020 735.00 308.70 392.00 123.48 392.00 164.64 1519.00 596.82 2115.82
2021 735.00 231.53 392.00 82.32 392.00 123.48 1519.00 437.33 1956.33
2022 735.00 154.35 392.00 41.16 392.00 82.32 1519.00 277.83 1796.83
2023 490.00 77.18 392.00 41.16 882.00 118.34 1000.34
245.00 25.73 245.00 25.73 270.73
Grant Total 12600.00 15545.25 6720.00 8290.80 6720.00 8290.80 26040.00 32126.85 58166.85
Rs. in Million
1st Loan 2nd Loan 3rd Loan
Year Principal Interest Principal Interest Principal Interest Total Total Total Annual
Principal Interest repayable
cont'd...
62Source:   Computed from the Loan details, MGP documents.
This note explains the computation of the repayment of principal and interest of the ADB loan assuming that the government
would continue to borrow as specified by the original contract. The total loan is divided into three parts ie. $375 million,
$200 million and $200 million. The first part is again divided into three tranches of $125 million each (see table 1). The
loan comes as Additional Central Assistance with 70 per cent as loan and 30 per cent as grant under the Gadgil formula.
Part of the loan tranche (50 per cent) is to be repaid in 20 equal instalments. According to the information provided by the
government, there is a grace period of 5 years for 50 per cent of the principal of each sub-tranche. The second part is to be
repaid after 5 years in 15 equal instalments. The interest is worked out based on the principle of charging on diminishing
balance. The rupee-dollar conversion is taken at 1$ = Rs. 48/-. In the absence of  clearer information, we assume that
interest payment will continue during the grace period as well. The repayment as worked out above can only be taken as
a broad trend as there is every possibility of a change in tranche and other regulations which would obviously reflect on
repayment.
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